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UNDERGROUND GAS STORAGE: OPPOSING RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
L Introduction
Demand for natural gas has increased during the past twenty years
to a level where pipeline companies cannot transport enough gas to meet
the needs of their customers during periods of peak use usually occurring
during cold weather. During the summer months, on the other hand,
pipeline companies transport more gas than needed, and this situation resulted
in an inefficient gas transport system which decreased a pipeline com-
pany's return on its investment. To remedy this situation, pipeline com-
panies utilize a system of gas storage. During the summer months the
companies transport the surplus gas to underground storage reservoirs
where it is injected and stored until the next winter. This process permits
the pipeline to operate at a higher efficiency level, resulting in higher
returns on investments and in lower gas prices. The process also increases
availability during the winter months.'
The advent of new industrial procedures is usually accompanied by
unforeseen legal problems. The courts must sift through the novel issues
and solve problems without the aid of precedent or statutory assistance
until legislatures have time to react to problems created by the new:
procedure. The purpose of this article is to report how courts have
resolved the principal issues involved in the underground storage of gas;
to- examine relevant statutes that have been enacted; and to address
additional problems that remain undecided.
Three parties have differing interests in the underground storage of
natural gas. First, storage companies (usually pipeline companies) are
concerned with the problems of applying for and receiving permission
to conduct storage operations from state regulatory agencies. They must
also acquire all the necessary rights from landowners and mineral interest
owners, and take measures to protect their stored gas from conversion.
Second, landowners and mineral owners are concerned with receiving
adequate compensation for transferring their respective rights to the
storage company and they must protect their interests in any remaining
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
I. See Scott, Underground Storage of Natural Gas: A Study of Legal Problems, 19
Okla. L. Rev. 47 (1966) for a similar discussion.
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minerals outside of the storage reservoir. Third, the state has an interest
in the production of existing minerals, if any, and in insuring the
availability of an adequate supply of gas in times of peak use. The
interest of these parties are interrelated and must be balanced against
each other to reach the most equitable solution. It is in this atmosphere
of balancing interests that the varying problems inherent in the under-
ground storage of natural gas will be discussed.
IL Rights To Depleted Sand
The storage company that wishes to store natural gas or other fluids
in a depleted underground formation must first determine who owns
the rights to that formation and what those rights are. The persons
who may have potential storage rights in a depleted reservoir include
the land surface owner, the mineral interest owner, the royalty owner,
and the reversionary interest owner. 2 Obviously, if the storage company
conducts storage operations without first acquiring the right to do so
from the proper owner, the company would commit a trespass and
could be held liable and enjoined from continuing storage operations.'
A major dispute in the past has been whether the land surface owner
or the severed mineral interest owner had the right to lease the depleted
underground reservoir for the storage of fluids. The determination of
this issue is extremely important to the storage company because they
want to be certain that they are leasing storage rights from the proper
party. If the company leases storage rights from the mineral interest
owner or the land surface owner and the courts determine that the other
party had sole right to lease underground storage rights, the company
would then either owe the other party damages for the underground
trespass or may even lose title to the illegally stored gas.4
There are two clear lines of decisions concerning the issue of leasing
storage rights. Under the first approach the proper party lessor is the
2. Id.
3. Id. at 54.
4. Unquestionably, if the gas storage company legally injects gas under Louisiana
land pursuant to La. R.S. 30:22(D) (Supp. 1986), see infra note 36 and accompanying
text, the gas storage company should retain title to the gas. However, the use of the
word "may" in that statute gives the commissioner discretion in appropriate situations
to decline to issue an order stating that the injected gas is the property of the injector.
Without that order, general Louisiana law would control and this illegally injected gas
should be treated the same as native gas-not owned by anyone until reduced to possession.
If the rights to remove minerals form the depleted reservoir reverted back to the landowner
when no more minerals were recoverable, the landowner should then own the right to
produce the illegally injected gas when the commissioner does not issue a La. R.S. 30:22(D)
order. If the mineral owner still had rights to the depleted reservoir, he should have the
right to produce this gas.
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mineral owner, while under the second approach the proper party lessor
is the landowner. The first approach originates in Kentucky. In Ham-
monds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co.,' an early decision, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals held that a land surface owner was not
entitled to compensation for storage of gas in a reservoir under her
land without her authorization. The court reasoned that natural gas
resembled a wild animal, and was ferae naturae. Once captured, the
gas is owned by the captor; but when released back into the ground
for purposes of underground storage, the gas regains its freedom and
is no longer owned by anyone. Therefore, the plaintiff could not maintain
her action against the storage company because the gas under the plain-
tiff's property no longer belongs to the defendant.
Several years later, and after much criticism of the Hammonds
decision, the Kentucky Court of Appeals again considered this issue in
Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Smallwood.6 This case involved
a dispute between surface owners and mineral interest owners over who
had rights to lease underground reservoirs for gas storage. The mineral
interest owner had leased his interest (which included the right to store
gas in underground formations), but there had never been any drilling
or production. The lease was kept alive by rental payments. The lessee,
through injection operations on other lands, stored gas in a formation
that extended into lands that were covered by the lease. The lease
provided for payments to the lessor for the storage of gas in the leased
land. The court was faced with determining to whom compensation was
due for the underground storage of this gas. The court recognized that
the rule in England was that the mineral owner has the exclusive right
to the possession of underground space containing or formally containing
oil or gas and has the use of the space for all purposes, but that in
the United States the rule seemed to be different. Here, the landowner
still owned the formation. However, the court concluded that in light
of the fugitive nature of oil and gas, the fact that there was still some
native gas in the formation, along with the Hammonds theory, that the
injector of gas loses title thereto upon injection, the mineral owner still
had rights to the once again productive sand and that he was entitled
to lease it and obtain the rental payments for the gas storage.
These two cases establish the mineral owner's authority to lease the
underground storage rights to depleted reservoirs in Kentucky. The Ken-
tucky courts seem to hold to this reasoning due to their determination
that ownership of natural gas is lost upon injection.'
Other jurisdictions have not followed Kentucky's lead and instead
have determined that the landowner has the right to lease underground
5. 75 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. Ct. App. 1934).
6. 252 S.W.2d 866 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952).
7. Discussed infra text accompanying notes 31-45.
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storage reservoirs. After Hammonds, but before Smallwood, the Okla-
homa Supreme Court, in Sunray Oil Co. v. Cortez Oil Co., said that
"being the owner of the land [a surface owner] has the right to use
the surface and substrata of her land as she sees fit, or permit others
so to do, so long as such use does not injure or damage other persons. '
This case dealt, with the injection of salt water, instead of natural gas,
into underground reservoirs; but the same reasoning should apply to
either situation.
Several years later, a similar result was reached in Tate v. United
Fuel Gas Co.,9 where a landowner sued a gas storage company for
conducting storage operations on and under his land without obtaining
a lease from him. The landowner had bought the land subject to a
reservation of all minerals except clay, sand, or surface minerals (except
those necessary to operate for oil and gas). The issue was whether the
mineral interest owner had reserved storage rights by the language in
the deed or whether the landowner had acquired the storage rights. The
court held that the deed had not reserved to the mineral interest owner
the rights to the depleted underground reservoir; therefore, the surface
owner had acquired the underground storage rights and consequently
had the exclusive right to lease those rights. Absent the wording in the
lease, the underground stratum may have been considered to be a
"mineral" under the terms of the lease and, thus, reserved in the sale
of the land. This would have given the mineral interest owner the right
to lease the underground stratum.' 0
A case not dealing with the right to lease a depleted stratum for
storage purposes but having implications concerning this issue arose
several years later in a Texas court of civil appeals. The issue addressed
in Atlantic Refining Co. v. Bright & SchiffP was whether the surface
owner or the mineral owner had the authority to give a proposed lessee
permission to directionally drill a well through the surface owner's land
that would bottom under adjacent land. The drilling would necessarily
proceed through strata in which the mineral interest owner owned min-
erals in place. If the mineral interest owner also owned the strata, it
follows that the proposed lessee would have to lease the right to drill
through this strata from the mineral interest owner. Also, if the mineral
interest owner owned the strata for this drilling purpose, the implications
are that he would also own it for the purpose of leasing the right to
store natural gas there. The court, however, determined that the land
surface owner had the exclusive right to give the proposed lessee per-
8. 188 Okla. 690, 698, 112 P.2d 792, 795 (1941).
9. 137 W. Va. 272, 71 S.E.2d 65 (1952).
10. Scott, supra note I, at 59.
II. 321 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
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mission to directionally drill through the subsurface strata; therefore, it
would also appear that he would have the right to lease subsurface
storage rights. Thus far, no Texas case has directly addressed this issue.
However, in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. West 2 the court made it
clear that the fee owner had the right to use underground strata for
storage purposes and that royalty owners could not enjoin them from
doing so. Admittedly, this does not determine the issue when the con-
troversy is between the landowner and the mineral owner, however, the
same reasoning may be applied by analogy to show that the landowner
may have the exclusive right to lease storage rights in Texas. In West,
the Texas Supreme Court cited a federal Court of Claims case, Emeny
v. United States, 3 where the federal government, as holder of all lease-
hold rights, was prevented by the landowner from using an underground
formation for the storage of helium, based on the reasoning that the
surface owner owned the underground formation. By citing this case,
the court, it can be argued, adopted the concept that the surface estate
included the right to lease the depleted formation. 4
In Ellis v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.'5 the storage company leased
the right to store gas in an underground depleted formation from the
owners of the severed minerals. They then leased the right to lay pipelines
and construct an injection well from the surface land owner. The surface
owner challenged the right of the owner of the severed minerals to lease
the underground storage rights. The court held that the surface owner,
not the mineral owner, had the right to lease subsurface storage rights.
The court said that mineral owners have nothing to lease once the
minerals have been depleted. However, in this case, the storage company-
had been continually storing gas longer than the statutory period required
for prescription (fifteen years), and therefore it had acquired the right
to store the gas.
In Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Sutton 6 a Louisiana Court of
Appeals treated the issue as already having been decided. There was no
historical treatment of the issue; and it was disposed of in one short
sentence: "[slurface ownership, however, includes the right to use the
reservoir underlying the [land] for storage purposes.""
These cases reveal a trend towards giving surface owners the exclusive
right to lease depleted underground strata for the storage of fluids.
12. 508 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1974).
13. 412 F.2d 1319 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
14. Comment, The Underground Natural Gas Storage and Conservation Act of 1977:
A Threshold Issue, 29 Baylor L. Rev. 1065, 1073 (1977).
15. 450 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Okla. 1978).
16. 406 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
17. Id. at 671.
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The thinking of legal scholars has also shifted toward the same
conclusion. In 1957 an early commentator stated:
The better view, it is submitted, would regard the mineral owner
as holding the principal storage rights in the stratum. The surface
owner ought to receive no compensation unless the storage com-
pany wants the right to utilize the surface in some way that
would not be regarded as a reasonable use if it were by a normal
mineral owner. 8
About ten years later, however, another writer took the opposite view
of the same issue, stating that a grant of minerals is not a grant of
the stratum they are locked in; therefore the surface owner owns the
stratum and has the right to lease storage rights in it.19
This shift in both case law and legal thinking seems to coincide
with an increase in the overall knowledge of the character of minerals.
During the developing stages in the oil and gas industry, it was long
thought that oil and gas flowed and migrated beneath the earth's surface. 20
If this were true one might conclude that the depleted reservoir may
one day be refilled by one of these migrating fluids. The mineral owner,
thus, would have an interest in the depleted strata for if these strata
were filled with storage gas or other fluids it would prevent any native
fluids from re-entering the strata. For this reason, in the past it was
recommended that storage companies acquire the interests of mineral
owners as to any remaining oil or gas and also as to any future migrating
minerals.2' With this limited knowledge, it is understandable how the
courts and scholars sought to protect the mineral owner's rights in the
depleted strata. We now realize that minerals are locked in non-permeable
container-like formations 2 and do not freely flow through underground
rivers, making it unnecessary to protect a mineral owner's interest in a
depleted reservoir. It is not going to refill absent a geological event
connecting two underground reservoirs. Since the surface owner owns
the land "from core to crust"23 it only makes sense that he, rather
than the mineral owner, owns depleted reservoirs. The "container" in
which minerals are locked should not be considered a part of the mineral
estate.
18. Stamm, Legal Problems in the Underground Storage of Natural Gas, 36 Tex. L.
Rev. 161, 172 (1957).
19. Scott, supra note I, at 59.
20. See, e.g., Stamm, supra note 18.
21. Id.
22. See Stamm, supra note 18 and accompanying text, where the author speaks of
reservoirs "locking in" minerals.
23. Scott, supra note 1, at 59.
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III. Rights To Unrecovered Gas and Oil
When gas or other fluids are sought to be stored in underground
reservoirs, those reservoirs usually contain a small amount of native gas
or oil. There also may be native oil and/or gas found in other reservoirs
either above or below the depleted reservoir that is sought to be used
for storage. These situations create two important issues. First, if there
is gas or oil remaining in the proposed storage reservoir, is the storage
company obligated to pay the owner of the interest in that oil or gas
its value according to the total amount there, or the value based
only on the recoverable amount? Second, can a person who has the
right to store gas in a depleted reservoir prevent the mineral owner from
recovering other minerals from separate reservoirs either above or below
the storage reservoir?
In Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Sutton,24 the owners of small
fractional interests in the rights to recover and produce natural gas were
entitled to compensation for the value of the recoverable gas and con-
densate. The storage company was the only party introducing evidence
as to the value of the recoverable minerals; therefore, this uncontradicted
evidence established the value to be paid to the mineral interest owners.
For reasons later explained, it is very important that a mineral interest
owner establish some uncertainty as to how much recoverable oil or gas
is present in the proposed storage reservoir.25
In West v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 26 an oil company seeking
to utilize an underground reservoir for storage of natural gas unilaterally
determined the amount of gas remaining in the reservoir. The company
then paid or offered to pay all of the royalty owners their share of the
estimated remaining volume. The appellate court granted the royalty
owners an injunction and stated that the storage company could not
use the underground reservoir for storage purposes until all of the native
gas had been produced. The storage company appealed and the Texas
Supreme Court held that the royalty owners could not prevent the storage
company from using the reservoir to store gas-the storage company
owned the reservoir. However, the court imposed upon the storage
company the burden of establishing the amount of recoverable gas in
the reservoir, and the company was required to pay the royalty owners
their share of that amount. The court stated that when injected gas
commingles with native gas the injector has the burden of proving the
share which is due to to the royalty owners when the gas is recovered
and produced. If they cannot do this, the loss must fall on the injector,
24. 406 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
25. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
26. 496 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), rev'd, 508 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1974), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 843 (1977).
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and it would owe royalty on all gas produced from the storage project.27
The court then remanded the case to determine if the storage company
could prove the recoverable amount of gas in the reservoir. On remand
the storage company admitted that it could not determine the recoverable
amount of gas, but it could prove the maximum amount of gas that
could possibly have remained in the reservoir and offered to pay royalty
based on that amount. The court approved this method, holding that
the storage company had met its burden by determining the maximum
amount although it had been ordered to determine the recoverable
amount .28
The evolution of the West case demonstrates the great importance
that creating doubt as to the remaining amount of gas has in fixing
the value to be paid to mineral interest owners. If doubt exists, the
mineral interest owners, under the reasoning used in West, will either
be entitled to payment on the maximum amount of gas in the reservoir,
if that amount can be determined, or to royalty payments on all of the
gas extracted from the storage reservoir.
The second issue, whether or not a storage company can prohibit
exploration for naturally occurring gas or oil above or below the storage
reservoir, was dealt with in Storck v. Cities Service Gas Co. 29 In Storck
landowners had executed a fifty year gas storage lease with an agreement
that they would not conduct operations above the base of the storage
strata leased. The landowners then executed a mineral lease to a company
that sought to explore for and produce oil from a separate reservoir
above the storage reservoir. When the lessee asked the storage company
for permission to conduct operations above their storage project, the
storage company refused. The court examined the lease and concluded
that a provision in a storage lease prohibiting oil and gas production
from non-storage strata was against public policy since it discourages
exploration for and production of sources of energy. The storage lessee
did not acquire the oil and gas or any rights thereto upon leasing a
lower stratum for storage. If the lessee is really intent on prohibiting
potentially damaging operations around his storage area, he should
acquire the rights to all the oil and gas under the property when leasing
the storage rights. Then if oil or gas is discovered above or below the
storage reservoir, the storage company can conduct recovery operations
in a manner that will not interfere with the storage operations. An
outright purchase of those mineral rights in states that allow ownership
of minerals separate from the land would accomplish this desired result.
27. Humble Oil and Refinery Co. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1974).
28. Exxon Corp. v. West, 543 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 875 (1977).
29. 575 P.2d 1364 (Okla. 1974).
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However, in Louisiana the storage company will not be able to tie
up indefinitely the rights to native oil or gas above or below the storage
reservoir. A "purchase" of minerals in Louisiana merely creates a ser-
vitude which entitles the purchaser to search for and produce the min-
erals, and this servitude prescribes in ten years absent a good faith
attempt to either search for or produce the minerals. The storage com-
pany might attempt to lease ihe rights to produce all minerals and
provide delay rentals for the right not to produce them. This or any
similar type of lease is faced with the same challenge as the lease in
Storck and because of their inhibitory effect on the production of oil
and gas, these leases may be found to violate public policy.
IV. Ownership of Injected Gas
The problems concerning ownership of injected gas are closely related
to those already discussed in parts II and III of this article. If the
injector loses ownership of the gas upon injecting it into the storage
formation, anyone else with the right to produce from that formation
can do so (unless they have given up their right to produce by contract
or in the storage lease). Likewise, if the injected gas somehow causes
damage, the injector cannot be held liable because he has lost ownership
of the gas, and therefore, it was not his gas that caused the damage.
If, on the other hand, the injector does not lose title to the gas upon
injection, no one else can produce his gas, and he will be liable for
any damage that the gas may cause.30 Also, if the injected gas strays
into formations that are not under the leased premises, the injector
would owe compensation to the landowner,3 and if compensation is
not paid, the landowner should be able to enjoin any continuing sub-
surface trespass. 2
There are two established lines of decisions on the issue of ownership
and a third concept, which is somewhat of a combination of the other
two, is emerging. The first theory has already been mentioned in the
previous discussion of Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas
Co.3 There the court took the view that injected gas becomes ferae
naturae and is no longer owned by the injector. This relieved the injecting
company from the obligation to pay a landowner for the use of sub-
surface. strata underlying her land when the injector's gas strayed into
it. However, because the gas under her land has no owner, it is assumed
that she could produce it freely-a matter that was not dealt with in
30. See Comment, Subsurface Storage of Gas, 39 Miss. L. J. 81, 83 (1967).
31. Scott, supra note I, at 54.
32. Id.
33. 75 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. App. 1934).
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the decision. The same court, again in Smallwood,34 stated that there
is no distinction in the title to gas once recovered and released for
subterranean storage and native gas before its initial recovery.
White v. New York State Natural Gas Corp." exemplifies the second
theory. In this case the production from the White well had fallen off
substantially, and the well was barely operating at a profit when pro-
duction suddenly increased dramatically. This increase in production
mysteriously coincided with the commencement of storage operations on
nearby property. The landowner claimed the right to continue to fully
produce from the White well, and the storage company countered with
the argument that all of the native gas had been produced and that
this renewed production was gas that had migrated from their adjacent
underground storage pool. The court held that title to natural gas, once
having been reduced to possession, is not lost by injection into an
underground storage reservoir. The storage company could recover from
those producing their injected gas under the theory of conversion upon
proving that it was their gas being produced. One way of proving this
is by comparing chemical properties of the stored gas with those of the
native gas. This method only works when the two gases have not mixed
for then the resulting mixture will have properties unlike either of the
two component gases, and a third type of gas is created. This concept
is important when considering the third concept of ownership of stored
gas.
The third theory, the "combination theory," of ownership, recog-
nizes that ownership of the gas is not lost when the gas is injected into
clearly defined reservoirs containing no recoverable natural gas. In this
situation the ownership of the gas is not subject to question because it
is easily identifiable when there is no native gas for the injected gas to
mix with or when there is only a small amount of unrecoverable native
gas. If native gas remains in recoverable amounts in the reservoir when
storage gas is injected, the resulting mixture is a third form of gas.
The mineral owner is entitled to compensation for the native gas in the
reservoir, but now "his" gas has been transformed and is unidentifiable
from the storage gas. Since the confusion of goods is the fault of the
storage company, it is only fair that they should bear the burden of
undoing their damage. If they are able to determine the amount of
recoverable native gas in the storage reservoir (or the maximum amount
of native gas), they can pay the mineral interest owners their share and
can retain ownership of the new mixture of gas. If they cannot make
34. 252 S.W.2d 866 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952) (stating that there is no distinction in the
title to gas once recovered and released for subterranean storage and native gas before
its initial recovery).
35. 190 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
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this determination, the third mixture gas becomes ferae naturae, and
the storage company may lose the right to produce the gas or may have
to pay royalty on all of the mixed gas produced. Remember, in Exxon
Corp. v. West 6 the mineral lessee/storage company mixed storage gas
with native gas without purchasing rights to the native gas beforehand.
The court held that if they could not determine the recoverable amount
of native gas (or the maximum amount), they would have to pay royalty
on all gas produced from the storage area just as if the title to the
stored gas had been lost. It follows that if the storage company was
not also the mineral lessee, it would not even have the right to produce
the mixed gas. If the storage company leased only the right to store
gas in the reservoir, they may have to pay the mineral owner the value
of the recoverable mixed gas before re-commencing storage operations.
If there is no mixture of storage gas and native gas or if the injector
acquires rights to the remaining native gas, there is no question that in
Texas the injector does not lose title to the injected gas. In Lone Star
Gas Co. v. Murchison," the court followed White instead of Hammonds
and determined that ownership of the injected gas was not lost. In Lone
Star a storage company injected gas into a reservoir underlying lands
where it had leased storage rights. The gas migrated through the reservoir
to a part underlying some unleased land. The mineral fee owner of the
unleased land drilled into the reservoir and began producing the stored
gas. The court determined these actions constituted a conversion of the
injector's gas since title was not lost by injection. Presumably, the storage
company would then have to either pay for the right to store the gas
under the unleased land or refrain from doing so.
In West Edmund Salt Water Disposal Association v. Rosecrans, s
the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that salt water was ferae naturae
when it commingled with existing salt water in a subsurface formation
and migrated under plaintiff's land displacing valuable minerals. The
salt water injector was not liable for damages resulting from this dis-
placement as the offending salt water was not owned by him. Applying
this same rationale to injected gas, it follows that if. injected gas mixes
with native gas such that the resulting mixture is no longer identifiable
as the injected gas, ownership to the ifijected gas is lost.
A lower Oklahoma court distinguished West Edmund in Ellis v.
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.3 9 when it held that ownership of injected
gas was not lost upon injection when, (1) it did not mix with any native
gas, and (2) the boundaries of the reservoir were capable of determi-
nation.
36. 543 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
37. 353 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
38. 204 Okla. 9, 226 P.2d 965 (1950).
39. 450 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Okla. 1978).
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With the jurisprudence in mind, the legislatures of Louisiana, Okla-
homa, and Texas established that generally, the injecting storage com-
pany owns the injected gas. Louisiana Revised Statutes (La. R.S.) 30:22(D)
provides that "[tlhe commissioner issue any necessary order providing
that all natural gas which has previously been reduced to possession,
and which is subsequently injected into an underground storage reservoir
shall at all times be deemed the property of the injector. . . ." 4 However,
the statute is careful to point out that if the project is not an approved
underground storage reservoir, the injector shall have no right to the
injected gas.41 This is a slight modification of the "non-ownership"
theory that exists in Louisiana. That theory is now limited, at least for
storage purposes, to native gas that has not been reduced to possession
and subsequently re-injected. By leaving the issuance of a La.R.S. 30:22(D)
order to the discretion of the Commissioner, the legislature has given
him the power not to issue such an order and to let the courts decide
the ownership of injected gas. A particularly appropriate situation for
him to exercise this discretion is when injected gas mixes with native
gas. The court could then decide the ownership of the mixed gas in
light of West Edmund and Ellis, and where royalty payments for pro-
duction of the native gas are at issue, the court may decide to place
the burden of proving the volume of the remaining native gas on the
injector as was done in West. 2
The above quoted Louisiana language follows almost verbatim the
language of the earlier Oklahoma statute dealing with the subject of
ownership of injected gas.43 The corresponding Texas statute similarly
states: "All natural gas in the stratum condemned which is not native
gas, and which is subsequently injected into storage facilities is personal
property and is the property of the injector. . . ." These states all start
with the basic principle that injected gas is the property of the injector.
When, if ever, the courts will decide not to apply that principle is yet
to be determined.
V. Consequences of the Ownership Theory
The determination of the Qwnership of injected gas carries with it
a determination of rights and liabilities of the storage company and the
landowner as well. As discussed in the beginning of section IV, if the
injector retains title to injected gas, he may be liable for damages caused
by his gas, while if he loses title upon injection the injected gas would
40. La. R.S. 30:22(D) (Supp. 1986).
41. Id.
42. 508 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1974).
43. 52 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 36.6 (1969).
44. 2 Tex. Nat. Resources Code § 91.182 (Supp. 1985).
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be subject to recovery by others. Since it appears that, generally, the
ownership of gas is not lost upon injection, except possibly in Kentucky,
unless the injected gas can no longer be identified, it would seem to
follow that the storage company would be liable for any damage caused
by the escape of the injected gas. However, in Tidewater Associated
Oil Co. v. Stott,45 a Texas recycler injected dry gas into a producing
formation, and it travelled through the formation and displaced wet gas
under premises not owned by the injector. The adjoining mineral owner
was denied recovery for damages caused by this displacement. A some-
what similar situation arose in the Oklahoma case, West Edmund Salt
Water Disposal Association v. Rosecrans,46 where salt water was injected
and it mixed with native salt water causing damage to a adjoining
mineral owner. There the adjoining mineral owner likewise was denied
recovery. Following this line of reasoning, some scholars espoused a
"negative rule of capture:"
What may be called a "negative rule of capture" appears to
be developing. Just as under a rule of capture a landowner may
capture oil or gas which may migrate from adjoining premises
to a well bottomed on his own land, so also may he inject into
a formation substances which may migrate through the structure
to the land of others, even if this results in the displacement
under such land of more valuable with less valuable substances
(e.g., the displacement of wet gas by dry gas). The law on this
subject has not been fully developed, but it seems reasonable
to suggest the qualification that such activity will be permitted,
free of any claim for damages, only if pursued as part of a
reasonable program of development and without injury to pro-
ducing or potentially producing formations. 47
Shortly after this theory was proposed the Texas Supreme Court,
in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Manziel,48 denied an attempt by
an adjoining mineral owner to enjoin water injection on nearby premises.
He claimed that the water would trespass under his land and would
cause premature loss of production from his wells. The court held that
the technical rules of trespass did not apply to underground migration
of injected fluids which were injected pursuant to a Commission order
authorizing secondary recovery.
While none of these cases dealt with injection of gas for storage
purposes, the reasoning would appear to be the same. Therefore, if
injected storage gas migrated off of the leased premises and displaced
45. 159 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 817 (1947).
46. Rosecrans, 226 P.2d at 965.
47. 1 Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 204.5, at 60 (1984).
48. 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962).
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other more valuable minerals, or caused other damages, application of
the "negative rule of capture" would indicate that the injector would
not be liable. This line of reasoning, however, seemed to stop there,
and the more recent cases have not hesitated to hold an injector of
fluids liable when the fluid causes damage off the leased premises.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court retreated in West Edmund Hunter
Lime Unit v. Lillard 9 from their earlier position espoused in Rosecrans
where they allowed an adjoining mineral owner to recover damages
resulting from injection of salt water on neighboring premises. In Lillard
the salt water migrated through the formation and prevented the neigh-
boring owner from removing casing. The damages he was allowed to
recover included the cost of the casing and the extraordinary costs
associated with shutting off the flow of the injected water onto his
premises. Because of evidentiary problems, he was prevented from re-
covering for any loss of well productivity.
The Texas courts have not yet reconsidered their position on this
matter, but courts from several other states have followed the Oklahoma
court's reasoning.
The Nebraska Supreme Court in 1969 dealt with this issue in Baum-
gartner v. Gulf Oil Corp,50 where the plaintiff refused to join a unitized
secondary recovery operation where water was injected to increase pro-
duction. The court allowed him to prove his damages that were caused
by the injected water entering formations beneath the surface of his
land and to recover for the harm caused by the injection process just
as if there had been no unitization. This case shows the importance of
unitizing all of the premises that may be affected by the storage op-
eration.
In Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson" a federal appellate court upheld
an award of compensatory damages resulting from an operator's flooding
of adjoining producing wells in Kansas.
A theory of nuisance was used to recover damages in an Oklahoma
case where the injection was pursuant to an Oklahoma Corporation
Commission authorization and caused damage to adjoining wells.,2
In Young v. Ethyl Corp.,s" the United States Eighth Circuit Court of
49. 265 P.2d 730 (Okla. 1954).
50. 184 Neb. 384, 168 N.W.2d 510 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
51. 320 F.2d 157 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 942 (1963).
52. Greyhound Leasing & Financial Corp. v. Joiner City Unit, 444 F.2d 439 (10th
Cir. 1971); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Hughes, 371 P.2d 81 (Okla. 1962) (imposing liability on
injector of saltwater for contaminating fresh water supply), compare this with the Texas Supreme
Court's decision in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962)
where the court refused to hold an injector liable when the injection was pursuant to a valid
administrative authorization.
53. 521 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1975).
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Appeals concluded that the injection of salt water into wells on adjoining
land dissolved valuable bromide under the plaintiffs land. The court
said this was a trespass and applied the "mild" rule for good faith
trespass in awarding damages. The Arkansas Supreme Court later fol-
lowed the federal courts' reasoning in Jameson v. Ethyl Corp.5 ' There
the court said:
A determination that a trespass or a nuisance occurs through
secondary recovery processes within a recovery area would tend
to promote waste of such natural resources and extend unwar-
ranted bargaining power to minority landowners. On the other
hand, a determination that the rule of capture should be ex-
panded to cover the present situation could unnecessarily extend
the license of mineral extraction companies to appropriate min-
erals which might be induced to be moved from other properties
through such processes and, in any event, further extend the
bargaining power of such entities to reduce royalty payments to
landowners who are financially unable to "go and do likewise"
as suggested by Ethyl."
The court resolved this problem by concluding that reasonable and
necessary secondary recovery processes should be permitted but that
when this process depletes minerals from adjoining lands or causes any
special damage to those lands the injector will be held liable.
Thus, the trend in recent cases is to hold the injector liable for
damage to unleased premises caused by injection of fluids. It is thus
extremely hazardous to engage in injection of storage gas in the absence
of unitization of al! premises which may be adversely affected by the
injection. Other consequences of the ownership theory have previously
been discussed and will not be repeated here.56
54. 271 Ark. 621, 609 S.W.2d 346 (1980). A consequence of the theory that injected
gas is still owned by the injector is that the gas cannot be extracted by others. If another
party does extract the gas it will constitute a conversion.
55. Id. at 626, 609 S.W.2d at 351.
56. One consequence of the theory that injected gas is still owned by the injector is
that the gas cannot be produced by others. If another party does so, it will amount to
a conversion. See White, 190 F. Supp. at 342; and the discussion supra, text accompanying
notes 30-44. Injected gas mixing with native gas in the storage formation or elsewhere
also presents problems. It is normally required that a storage formation be entirely or
substantially depleted before storage operations can be conducted therein. If there is any
remaining native gas it should be accounted for and the rights to that gas acquired prior
to engaging in any storage operation. If this is not done, a mixture will result between
the injected gas and remaining native gas. As discussed supra, note 29 and accompanying
text, the injector has the burden of proving how much of this gas is his and of differ-
entiating his gas from the native gas. If the injector cannot do this, there results a
confusion of goods. When there is a confusion of goods the person responsible for the
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VI. Statutory Authority to Acquire Storage and Related Rights
A gas pipeline company or other enterprise that desires to conduct
an underground gas storage operation must acquire the rights to do so
from the holders of those rights. There are essentially two methods of
doing this: (1) reach an agreement with the holders of the desired rights
and acquire them through a contract, or (2) when no agreement can
be reached, the company can acquire the desired rights from the holders
by the power of eminent domain. Clearly the first method is the most
desirable as there will be fewer hard feelings. However, all too often
the parties cannot reach an agreement, and in those situations the storage
company must resort to expropriation. The law of contracts regulates
the relationship arising when the parties reach a contractual agreement;
therefore, contractual disputes will not be discussed here.
This section deals with the statutory right of a storage company to
acquire the rights needed to conduct storage operations while a later
section deals specifically with the problems incurred when exercising that
right. Also discussed in the following sections are the problems which
occur in determining what rights the storage company needs to acquire.
The power to expropriate storage and related rights by a private
storage company must be granted by statute. A storage company must
first determine whether to undertake expropriation under federal statute
or under state statute.
Federal authority to expropriate storage rights is granted by the
Natural Gas Act." That act states in pertinent part:
When any holder of a certificate of public convenience and
necessity cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with
the owner of property to the compensation to be paid for, the
necessary right-of-way to construct, operate, and maintain a pipe
line or pipe lines for the transportation of natural gas, and the
necessary land or other property, in addition to right-of-way,
for the location of compressor stations, pressure apparatus, or
other stations or equipment necessary to the proper operation
of such pipe line . . . it may acquire the same by the exercise
of the right of eminent domain .... 11
confusion is the one who usually must bear the loss. See, e.g. Storck, 575 P.2d at 1364;
Ellis, 609 F.2d at 436; West, 496 S.W.2d at 212. In states with the ownership theory,
the injector responsible for confusion would lose title to his gas and the gas would become
owned by the person owning the gas with which it was mixed. In states without the
ownership theory, the injector would lose title to the gas; and the person owning the
right to search for and produce minerals in the land where the resulting mixture is found
would have the right to produce that gas.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1982).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (1982).
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The wording does not clearly include storage rights among those rights
that may be expropriated. However the broad language "or other stations
or equipment necessary for the proper operation of such pipeline" has
been construed to include storage rights.5 9 The federal district court in
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Commission stated:
"In our opinion . . . the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) grants
the powers of eminent domain for the acquisition and construction of
underground storage facilities for natural gas."' 6 It should be noted that
a "certificate of public convenience or necessity" is required and can
be obtained from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
upon a finding that the applicant is able and willing to do what he
proposes to do and to cbnform with the provisions of the Natural Gas
Act.6'
In addition to this federal authorization to expropriate, storage
companies are, many times, given approximately the same powers by
state statutes, although there may be additional requirements included.
State statutes for Louisiana, Texas, and Oklahoma will be examined.
The additional requirements added by these states should only apply
when the storage company elects to use state condemnation procedures,
and they do not apply to federal procedures due to the Interstate
Commerce and Supremacy Clauses of the United States Constitution. 62
Louisiana
The power of a storage company to expropriate storage rights in
Louisiana63 is given by La. R.S. 30:22 which provides in part:
Prior to the use of any underground reservoir for the storage
of natural gas and prior to the exercise of eminent domain by
any person, firm or corporation having such right under laws
of the state of Louisiana, and as a condition precedent to such
use or to the exercise of such rights of eminent domain, [the
commissioner must make certain findings]."
The wording of this statute plainly indicates that the person desiring to
exercise the 'power of eminent domain must have a right to do so that
is granted under some other "laws of the state of Louisiana." This
power is given to a storage company by La. R.S. 19:2(5) provided that
59. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 369 F. Supp. 156
(S.D. Iowa 1974).
60. Id. at 159.
61. IS U.S.C. §§ 717(f)(d) & (e) (1982).
62. See Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 369 F. Supp. at 160.
63. See Dakin, Developments in the Law 1979-1980 Term-Expropriation, 41 La. L.
Rev. 474 (1981).
64. La. R.S. 30:22B (1975).
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the storage company is a "domestic or foreign corporation created for
the piping and marketing of natural gas." '65 This power is also condi-
tioned on nonagreement as to the price to be paid for the desired storage
rights by the owner and storage company. In Mid-Louisiana Gas Co.
v. Sanchez66 these two statutes were read together to mean that a pipeline
company had the implied authority to expropriate above ground and
underground property rights for gas storage purposes.
Oklahoma
In Oklahoma a storage company that cannot agree with owners and
that desires expropriation must first get a certificate from the commission
stating certain findings of the commission. 67 The storage company must
then file a petition in district court that states their purpose, describes
the property rights desired and the property, and lists the owners of
those rights. The storage company must also attach the certificate that
was obtained from the commission. The commission must make several
determinations before issuing the required certificate:
Any natural gas public utility may condemn for its use for the
underground storage of natural gas any subsurface stratum or
formation in any land which the commission shall have found
to be suitable and in the public interest for the underground
storage of natural gas, and in connection therewith may condemn
such other interests in property as may be required adequately
to examine, prepare, maintain and operate such underground
natural gas storage facilities .... 6
The judge then determines if the storage company should have the power
of eminent domain. 69  The statute goes on to list several limitations
on the right to expropriate. By using the wording, "such other interests
in property as may be required" the Oklahoma statute is broader in
language than the Louisiana statute and is also more far sighted. Plainly,
there are peripheral rights that need to be acquired along with the right
to store gas in underground strata. Such peripheral rights may include:
(1) the right to use the surface for storage operations; (2) the right to
acquire rights to existing native oil or gas in the desired strata; (3) the
right to lay pipelines; (4) the right to monitor gas flow through, or out
of, the storage strata; (5) the right to drill through land and producing
formations to reach the storage reservoir; and (6) any other necessary
rights.
65. La. R.S. 19:2(5) (Supp. 1985).
66. 280 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
67. 52 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 36.4 (1969).
68. 52 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 36.3 (1969).
69. 52 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 36.5 (1969).
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Texas
The state of Texas has recently enacted a comprehensive body of
legislation dealing with underground gas storage. 70 A storage company
desiring to exercise the power of eminent domain must first obtain an
order from the commission (which is obligated to make certain findings).
After receiving the commission's order approving the storage facility,
the storage company can proceed to condemn "any subsurface sand,
stratum, or formation for the underground storage of natural gas,
condemning all mineral and royalty rights as are reasonably necessary
for the operation of the storage facility ... and the storer may condemn
any other interests in property that may be required . . . ."" This right
is subject to several limitations and provisions, but like the Oklahoma
statute, it provides for condemnation of any necessary peripheral rights
along with the right to acquire use of the subsurface strata for storage.
It would be desirable for Louisiana to have a provision similar to
the Oklahoma and Texas provisions allowing expropriation of all nec-
essary rights to prevent Louisiana courts from having to stretch the
wording of existing statutes to cover expropriation of these peripheral
rights.
VIII. Problems with Expropriation of Underground Storage Rights
Several problems can occur when the power of eminent domain,
either through federal or state procedures, is exercised. When no agree-
ment can be reached between the storage company and the holders of
rights that need to be acquired and the storage company resorts to
condemnation, the atmosphere becomes hostile, and the parties take
adversarial positions. Legal problems inevitably result. By far, the most
important and mostfrequently recurring of these problems is deciding
the value of the rights to be expropriated. There are several approaches
taken in determining the value of storage rights in an underground
formation. Some jurisdictions use a before and after market value test.
Others rely on comparable values in other storage projects and at least
one jurisdiction has found that the rights had no value at all. The
general rule for arriving at the value of rights to be expropriated is
that: "as in eminent domain, it is generally the owner's loss and not
the taker's gain that should determine the compensation, and therefore
it should not be based on the value of the land to the condemnor for
gas storage purposes. ' 72  A discussion of representative methods of
valuing the storage rights, beginning with the older cases and ending
70. 2 Tex. Nat. Resources Code § 91.171 (Supp. 1986).
71. 2 Tex. Nat. Resources Code § 91.179 (Supp. 1986).
72. 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain § 348.
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with newer ones, should aid in understanding the appropriate method
of valuation.
In Peoples Gas Light and Coke Co. v. Buckles" the trial court
excluded the landowners' evidence of land value based on its use for
underground storage purposes and awarded them twenty-five dollars per
acre for storage rights. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, stating
that there was no taking of the fee or damage to the surface involved.
The taking was that of an easement and the measure of damages was
based upon a diminution of the fair market value of the property. The
court found that there was no market value for the storage right itself,
reasoning that since the plaintiff was the only person who had been
granted the certificate needed to condemn storage rights and everyone
else was precluded from doing so. Thus, there could be no "leisurely
sale from a willing seller to a willing buyer" which is needed to establish
market value.
The Illinois Supreme Court addressed the valuation matter again
two years later in Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v. Mason.7 4 There
the court held that evidence proffered by landowners to establish that
the highest and best use of the land was as a gas storage reservoir had
been properly excluded at trial; thus, the only remaining evidence as to
the value of the storage right was that offered by the storage company
showing that these rights were valueless; and the court awarded no
compensation for the taking of those rights.
A Michigan Court of Appeals took a somewhat more enlightened
view on the subject several years later in Consumers Power Company
v. Allegan State Bank." There the gas company had acquired rights
from seventy-five percent of the owners of the surface area and from
seventy-five percent of the owners of the rights in the underground
strata; and the company brought suit for condemnation of the rest. The
trial court awarded the owners of the remaining rights $479,000 collec-
tively, which amount was reduced to $170,000 by a probate court because
of improper expert testimony as to the value. The court of appeals
reversed this reduction saying that it was proper for the court to consider
both the market value of the formations and the fact that this value
was enhanced due to the fact that the formations formed a natural
container and were exceptionally adapted and available for use as a gas
storage reservoir. The court also said that "[s]imilar sales and purchases
on the open market without benefit of condemnation ... could be used
as proper comparables as a basis for an opinion on market value." 76
73. 182 N.E.2d 169 (Il. 1962).
74. 31 Ill. 2d 340, 201 N.E.2d 379, cert. denied, 380 U.S, 124 (1964).
75. 20 Mich. App. 720, 174 N.W.2d 578 (1969).
76. Id. at 750, 174 N.W.2d at 592.
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In Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Sanchez" a Louisiana appellate court
considered the value of the residual gas in the reservoir, the particular
adaptability of the property, and the broad comparison with the value
paid for the storage rights in other fields when valuing expropriated
storage rights. These factors were also used in Trunkline Gas Co. v.
Rawls,78 and the court also concluded that where there was only a
"remote possibility" that native gas could be commercially producible,
this factor should still be given some consideration in valuing the un-
derground strata. The court also said that it was proper to consider the
detrimental effect a storage area would have on oil and gas exploration
which might occur at greater depths. The court rejected the plaintiff/
storage company's "market value" approach which only compared sales
the plaintiff had consummated in the area that was under the threat of
condemnation, because no consideration was given to the special suit-
ability of the property or to residual native gas.
An excellent discussion on the subject of expropriation of storage
rights is found in Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Poland.79 There the
court said:
Natural gas marketing companies do not enjoy quicktaking ex-
propriation power such as is enjoyed by the Department of
Highways, but first must establish in an expropriation action,
the public and necessary purpose to be served by the expro-
priation (LSA-Constn. Art. 1, § 4), the approval of the Com-
missioner of Conservation (LRS 30:22(B), and that good faith
negotiation has been conducted with the owner for acquisition
of the property (LRS 19:2(5)). After these prerequisites have
been established the amount of just compensation under LSA
Constn. Art. 1., § 4 is to be judicially determined.10
The court noted that there were three distinct rights taken: the right to
recoverable gas and condensate, the servitude of use of the surface, and
the storage rights in the underground reservoir. The court expressly
rejected the proposition that some compensation may be due for un-
recoverable native gas or oil.
It is submitted that what may be unrecoverable today may not be
so tomorrow. If methods are developed making some of the remaining
unrecoverable gas now recoverable will the courts permit recovery of
this newly recoverable gas by the person from whom the rights to the
remaining oil and gas were expropriated? Probably not. At that point
there may be a "taking" for which just compensation is due. It is for
77. 280 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
78. 394 So. 2d 1250 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 400 So. 2d 904 (1981).
79. 406 So. 2d 657 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
80. Id. at 660.
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this very reason that the Trunkline rationale, providing compensation
for the "remote possibility" that native resources could become com-
mercially recoverable, should be followed. The mineral interest owners
would be compensated for the loss of a "hope of future production,"
and if similar production later becomes feasible, the storage company
will not have to further compensate the owners.
What constitutes a judicial determination of just compensation as
required by Article 1, Section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution is a matter
of some ambiguity. The commissioner is required, prior to use of an
underground reservoir for storage purposes, to determine: "[Wihether
or not such reservoir is fully depleted of the original commercially
recoverable natural gas and condensate content therein. If the commis-
sioner finds that such reservoir has not been fully depleted, the com-
missioner shall determine the amount of remaining commercially
recoverable natural gas and condensate content of such reservoir."'" This
evaluation ensures that those who have an interest in the remaining
minerals but cannot afford independent studies as to their quantity are
apprised of this information. It can also serve as a check on the storage
company to ensure that it does not withdraw more gas than it injects.82
Its apparent purpose, however, would seem to be to put into operation
La. R.S. 30:22(B)(i) which prohibits storage operations if any native minerals
remain. The commissioner's evaluation cannot, however, be binding on
the court in an expropriation hearing to determine the amount of just
compensation to be paid for the storage rights taken. This would conflict
with the judicial determination requirement of the Louisiana Constitu-
tion. The report is relevant and if all other evidentiary requirements are
met, it may be admissible as evidence, but it should in no way be
binding on the court.
In Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Latham3 the owners of rights
in subsurface strata asked:
that the Commission's order be limited by a suitable restriction
to clearly indicate that the finding to the effect that "there is
no recoverable native gas in the reservoir" is for the purpose
of the proceedings before the Commission and is not to be used
in derogation of the landowners' rights to seek compensation
for an amount and value of native gas under the provisions of
Article 2, Sec. 24 of the Oklahoma Constitution. 84
81. La. R.S. 30:22 (C) (1975).
82. See 2 Tex. Nat. Resources Code § 91.176 (Supp. 1985).
83. 650 P.2d 49 (Okla. 1982).
84. Id. at 50.
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The court agreed and restricted the use of the Commission order. The
procedures in Oklahoma are similar to those used in Louisiana; therefore,
the same result should follow.
The landowners, in an expropriation proceeding required to be held
in the parish where the property is located, 5 should be able to introduce
any and all evidence which they have to establish the value of the
property expropriated. This should not be considered a collateral attack
on the commissioner's findings prohibited by La. R.S. 30:22(C), since
those findings should be considered merely evidence and should not be
binding on the court in an expropriation suit. If the landowners attacked
the order "for purposes of proceedings before the commissioner," as
indicated in Latham, the attack would have to be made at the domicile
of the commissioner,8 6 but this is not the case when determining just
compensation in a condemnation suit. The findings of the commissioner
in Louisiana are not made to determine the issue of just compensation,
nor can they be, as that is prohibited by the Louisiana Constitution.
The landowners do not have the same incentive to oppose a commis-
sioner's finding that is required to be made when a storage company
is seeking permission to store gas as they do when their rights to their
property are being taken.
There is a wide range of values to be placed on the property rights
condemned when comparing the holdings of the Illinois and the Louisiana
courts. Obviously, the higher the value that the courts place on the
expropriated rights, the more satisfied the landowners will be and the
better the long term relations between the storage company and the
landowners will be. The closer that the courts get to the lower (Illinois)
end of the scale the more hostile the parties will become, and long term
relations will probably suffer. The difference in. a fair price and one
less than fair is so slight when compared to the overall cost of imple-
menting storage operations 7 and the fact that this slight increase can
readily be passed on as costs by the pipeline company should favor the
courts awarding just compensation toward the more liberal end of the
scale.
Fred McGaha
85. La. R.S. 19:2.1.
86. La. R.S. 30:12(A)(2) (Supp. 1986); but see Jordan v. Sutton, 424 So. 2d 305
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
87. See Jordan v. Sutton, 424 So. 2d 305 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), where the storage
company had already spent 97 million dollars before acquiring all of the landowners'
rights.
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